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Efforts to deter corporate crime have been thwarted by difficulties in
identifying and apprehending perpetrators, and in determining
appropriate terms for liability. Sara Seck's article, "Home State
Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining," offers
an important commentary on the question of corporate social responsibility
in a global era, and the corporation's relationship to state sovereignty,
international relations, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Drawing on
Canada as a case study, Seck attempts to establish clear legal norms and
processes that would hold Canadian corporations accountable for human
rightsviolation I She argues that the implementation of home state
regulation in Canada (and elsewhere) will provide strong incentives for
Canadian mining companies to conduct their overseas business ventures in
socially and environmentally responsible ways.
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In Part II, I will summarize Seck's argument, focusing on her proposal
to pursue corporate violations abroad through home state jurisdiction. In
Part III, I will evaluate Seck's proposal, considering the benefits and
drawbacks to this approach toward promoting accountability for corporate
crimes. In Part IV, I offer my own alternative to home state regulation: the
establishment of an international court that has jurisdiction over corporate
crimes. I conclude by proposing a realistic assessment of promoting
t B.A. 2006, Northwestern; M.A. 2008, Yale University. The author wishes to thank the
following individuals for feedback on an earlier draft of this piece: Nicole Hallett, Zachary D.
Kaufman, Amy Meek, and Diana Rusk.
1. Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining,
11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177, 181 (2008).
2. Id.
1
Bernhard: Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
accountability for corporate crimes committed overseas. Because Seck's
argument is expansive, I will limit my focus of this response to the question
of jurisdiction over corporate crimes and what forum would most
effectively address them.
II. THE NEED TO ADDRESS CORPORATE CRIME
Seck provides a brief overview of the Canadian Government's
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT),
which examined allegations that Canadian mining companies had
committed human rights violations in developing countries. 3 She begins
with a discussion of nationality and territoriality as preliminary
justifications for the exercise of home-state regulation, and acknowledges
the difficulties posed by extraterritorial application of its justiciability.
4
Seck's call for increased home state accountability is compelling for its
identification of the need to curb corporate abuses through law. Her
illustration of situations in which states can legitimately exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals would
be made even stronger if further developed to include the economics of
home state regulation. Despite a conscientious agenda, Seck's ideal of "full
implementation of the three pillars of participation rights" 5 does not
thoroughly address the financial stakes of home state regulation. In an era
of globalization with growing corporate interest in emerging markets and
foreign investment,6 the question of jurisdiction is crucial not only to the
protection of human rights but also to the overseas operation of businesses.
Whether Canada should implement legislation to ensure that corporate
wrongdoers are held legally accountable in Canadian courts is not the only
question we should pose. Rather, I suggest that it would be an effective
and efficient endeavor to explore whether governments could and should
defer to an international court with the power and the authority to hold
corporate wrongdoers accountable.
My response to Seck's article attempts to treat the problem of
jurisdiction she articulates as a complicated global initiative, and posits the
institutionalization of internationally agreed-upon procedures to deal with
corporate crimes through the advent of an International Corporate
Criminal Court (ICCC). 7 I emphasize that this alternative is not a rebuttal
to Seck's proposal but rather a supplemental proposal that should be
considered alongside it. Domestic courts are certainly one possible
3. Id. at 179-81.
4. Id. at 187-92.
5. Id. at 206.
6. See, e.g., NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 5-9 (2002)
("[Clorporations involved in international trading... are major actors in the processes of
globalisation.... Because of the economic power of these entities and their ability to invest in
other countries they can force a country, competing for foreign direct investment, to lower its
standards.").
7. I am grateful to Zachary D. Kaufman for helping me develop the idea of an
international court to address corporate crimes.
[Vol. 11
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mechanism to confront corporate crimes committed abroad. However, an
ICCC-if such a court could be created and endowed with adequate
resources and enforcement powers-would be a more successful forum, or
at least a helpful backstop in cases where domestic courts are unwilling or
unable to address corporate crimes.8
III. EVALUATION OF SECK'S ARGUMENT
Explanations and exculpations for corporate crimes demand a serious
examination of the occupational and organizational structures that may
have enabled criminal conduct. Seck should be credited with identifying a
critical problem of corporate accountability and proposing a means for
addressing it; however, while she identifies the urgency of a home state
regulation program, Seck bases her argument on the idea that the
individuals or cases subject to host state jurisdiction have been clearly
identified and/or that home state governments would be willing and able
to enforce their claimed jurisdiction.9 In doing so, she does not make
explicit the groups or individuals that can be prosecuted, in what
circumstances, and for what sorts of crimes; furthermore, readers are left to
wonder whether Seck's chief concern is civil liability, criminal liability, or
both. Finally, Seck fails to provide convincing evidence for the
effectiveness of home state jurisdiction.
Initially, Seck asserts the validity of a home state's jurisdiction based
on that state's overwhelming number of connections to the host state: as
examples of these "territorial points of control," she mentions "stock
exchanges, financial institutions and enabling corporate laws, as well as
specific support mechanisms associated with services provided by export
credit agencies and trade commissioners."10 Even if they are compelling
default judicial forums, do home states truly have the ability to advance a
global regime of human rights, to define its scope, or to apply that regime
to multinational corporations abroad, simply because they are financially
supportive of or otherwise related to the foreign satellite offices of
domestically-based corporations?
Seck later wields the territoriality principle as a justification for host
state regulation, reasoning that it gives legal authority for a state to exercise
jurisdiction in a case due to the location of the crime." This system of
home-state-versus-host-state claims works well when there is a clear line of
8. See generally WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPEcTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 415 (2007) ("The existence of international crimes and the recognition of individual
responsibility for such crimes logically suggests that there should be an international tribunal
with power to try individuals for the commission of international crimes. it is just as
important to have an international criminal court to administer international criminal law as it
is to have national criminal courts to administer national criminal law. For however objective
and impartial national courts in fact may be, because they are courts of particular states there
will inevitably be a suspicion of bias when a national court tries an international
criminal ... ".
9. Seck, supra note 1.
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demarcation between the two state jurisdictions, and prosecutions may be
initiated in the appropriate court. But laws and rules are not always so
straightforward, and disagreements can arise when both states may claim
jurisdiction.12 Perhaps Seck implicitly acknowledges this ambiguity when
she brings up concurrent jurisdiction as another mitigating possibility for
home state regulation. 13 In her explanation of the dilemma of concurrent
jurisdiction-whereby two authorities both have a credible claim to
jurisdiction over a particular crime-Seck rightly points out that "a critical
question in the extractive industries context is how to address potential
problems that might arise in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over
non-egregious human rights violations."
14
Although her identification of the phenomenon of concurrent
jurisdiction is appropriate in the context of a discussion about home state
regulation, Seck does not resolve the consequences that inevitably
accompany such a dilemma. If neither the home state nor the host state can
agree on jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction will not necessarily suffice as a
panacea. 15 Working against her own claims, Seck offers hypothetical
examples that are precisely the kind of situations in which two states
would be unlikely to agree-for instance, a situation in which the host state
worries that the home state will be lenient on its nationals. 16 Even if
culpability could be identified, a home state might not want to defer the
prosecution of a case to a host state if the home state did not trust the host
state's justice system to be fair. For example, after declaring that the
Sudanese government complicit in the Darfur genocide, 17 the U.S.
government would likely be reluctant to allow Sudanese courts to
prosecute Americans suspected of committing crimes in Sudan. Finally,
12. See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 349 ("Extrapolating from the Rwandan case, the Article points to
areas of difficulty and potential friction-particularly, but not only, including the distribution
of defendants-that are likely to arise in regimes of concurrent national and international
jurisdiction.").
13. See Seck, supra note 1, at 192.
14. See id. at 194.
15. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug.
2001, at 86 (arguing that universal jurisdiction violates state sovereignty and creates political
and legal chaos). Kissinger argues that "an excessive reliance on universal jurisdiction may
undermine the political will to sustain the humane norms of international behavior so
necessary to temper the violent times in which we live." Id. at 96. According to Kissinger,
since any number of states could set up such universal jurisdiction tribunals, the process
could quickly degenerate into politically driven show trials to attempt to place a quasi-judicial
stamp on a state's enemies or opponents. Id. at 92. But see Kenneth Roth, Response, The Case
for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 150, 150 (responding directly to
Kissinger by arguing that his "objections [to universal jurisdiction] are misplaced, and the
alternative he proposes is little better than a return to impunity").
16. Seck, supra note 1, at 194. Cf. GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 95 (1991)
(citing an instance where Swiss officials detained a French national because they believed that
"if he were to be released there was a serious risk that he might flee to France from where
extradition would be impossible and where there was no guarantee that he would be
prosecuted for the offences committed in Switzerland.").
17. Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 2004, at Al.
[Vol. 11
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Seck's proposal may produce unintended consequences that undermine
the economic activities she identifies or the legal regimes she proposes. If a
home state aggressively pursued corporate crimes committed overseas,
corporations might relocate their headquarters to jurisdictions that do not
threaten to hold corporations accountable for crimes they commit abroad.
Alternatively, corporations may retain the location of their front offices but
limit or eliminate their activities abroad, thus reducing their potential for
expanding the market for their goods and services.
I list these possibilities to illustrate the importance of states' identities
to their particular bilateral relationships, which inform their own potential
experience with concurrent jurisdiction. Seck insists that concurrent
jurisdiction over corporate malfeasance is quite common, but she may
underestimate the nature and number of conflicts that overlapping
jurisdiction can cause. None of these outcomes is desirable from the
perspective of either the home state or the host state, especially if
corporations are providing the host state with critical foreign investment
and profits back home.
As a final justification for home state regulation, Seck cites universal
jurisdiction, which contends that the responsibility to police corporate
crimes is erga omnes, or an "obligation" as she refers to it.18 While some
may optimistically believe that corporations privilege public accountability,
transparency, and enlightened self-interest, the reality is that the "choice"
of underdeveloped countries not to adopt such stringent human rights
standards may stem from their desire to attract foreign investment. Seck's
argument raises some significant questions: first, do developing countries
have a legitimate interest in determining their own policies? Second, what
transnational regimes are reasonable to employ in order to monitor and
restrain corporations irrespective of the territory in which they operate?
Finally, is Seck's proposal of home state regulation tantamount to a
mobilization of the "developed" legal systems of rich countries in order to
police and sanction corporate practices in places where it is impractical or
impossible to invoke local law? A Canadian corporation, for example,
would likely be reluctant to subject itself to a universal regime of human
rights, or to operate under a mandate of enforceable responsibility, if the
economic stakes were set too high. Indeed, the first section of Seck's article
is entitled "Home State Reluctance."1 9 Additionally, Seck concedes that
"[m]any matters of concern to local communities impacted by global
mining are not violations of international criminal law or matters of
universal jurisdiction, but rather concern the realization of indigenous or
local community rights."20 Consequently, because domestic courts have
different priorities than indigenous peoples, universal jurisdiction is not
necessarily an effective means to address international corporate crimes.
18. See Seck, supra note 1, at 200. See also Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 39 (2003) (discussing the concept of erga
omnes).
19. See Seck, supra note 1, at 181.
20. Id. at 194.
2008]
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Seck's argument alternately raises concerns about the implications of
imposing one country's legal regime on another or appealing to the tenets
of universal jurisdiction, which are typically reserved for the most heinous
crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other
atrocities. Certainly, states and their corporations have an obligation to
behave ethically and to uphold stringent safety and human rights codes,
but how does that obligation translate into law? Once codified, this law
has the potential to raise doubts about the appropriateness or effectiveness
of trying such cases in the domestic courts of nations with little connection
to the crimes charged. Furthermore, Seck does not consider that legal
policy in corporate culpability must be based on a systematic analysis of
corporate decision-making that sets out factual patterns or deterrence
strategies; a normative argument alone probably will not motivate
companies to change their actions.
21
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: AN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL
COURT DESIGN
Recognizing that Seck is correct to point out the absence of an effective
means to address corporate crimes, I propose an alternative to the
problematic solution she offers. In this part, I will first discuss the design
of an international court that has jurisdiction over corporate crimes and
then present both benefits and drawbacks to such an institution.
An alternative to Seck's proposal is the trial of individuals and
corporations in an International Corporate Criminal Court (ICCC). The
creation of a new tribunal for corporate crimes is potentially more viable
than home state jurisdiction, and superior to expanding the jurisdiction of
an existing tribunal. I refer to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a
model.22 Like the ICC,23 the ICCC would be designed to provide redress
for particularly egregious offenses, as well as crimes for which states are
unlikely to hold their citizens or corporations accountable: violation of safe
conduct, child labor practices, widespread and long-lasting environmental
damages, forced relocation, fraud, direct cooperation between corporations
and oppressive regimes, and corruption. If a corporation is charged with
violating these articulated international laws, it could be held liable by the
court, even if a host or home state objects. The ICCC would be a
transnational judicial body that identifies corporate malpractice while
21. The debate over legalism versus voluntarism features elsewhere in this volume. See,
e.g., Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: Implications of the Resource Curse
on CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 37 (2008) (arguing that both
voluntary and mandatory CSR models are problematic in addressing sustainable
development).
22. The ICC was established by a treaty concluded in Rome, Italy, in mid-1998. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted and opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
23. The jurisdiction of the ICC "shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against
humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression." Id. art. 5.
[Vol. 11
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acknowledging that corporate self-regulation and voluntary displays of
responsibility cannot always suffice as a guide to corporate practice.
There are growing attempts to envision and develop blueprints for
regulating multinational corporations (MNCs) by subjecting them to a set
of universal standards that will apply to corporations above and beyond
the demands of any specific locality. Attempts at this level include
pressures on global and regional bodies such as the United Nations (U.N.),
the European Union (EU), and the World Bank to develop enforceable
regulatory frameworks subjecting MNCs to standards of operation that can
be systematically monitored, assessed, and, when necessary, enforced. 24
In fact, hundreds of businesses have already expressed an interest in
forging a system of corporate culpability. Consider the United Nations
Global Compact, a framework for businesses that have pledged to align
their activities with multiple universally accepted principles concerning
human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. 25 The Global
Compact claims that, "[a]s the world's largest, global corporate citizenship
initiative, the Global Compact is first and foremost concerned with
exhibiting and building the social legitimacy of business and markets." 26
Seck has clearly delineated that there are coordination problems inherent in
resolving corporate wrongdoing, and I propose building on existing efforts,
like the United Nations Global Compact, to address these problems
through a transnational solution that would supplement domestic efforts.
A. Establishment
The ICCC could be created by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC),
which would craft the Court's statute, rules, and procedures (affording
suspects commonly respected guarantees of due process) and select its
senior staff, including judges and chief prosecutor. The Court could either
be permanent or ad hoc, after the model of the U.N. International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 27 Staffing
would be left to the determination of the UNSC: states would have the
power to nominate individuals, and an election would follow. Such a
transparent selection process organized by a recognized world body would
augment the institution's legitimacy.
When the government of the state in which the alleged crime occurred
is not authentically representative, or its domestic judicial system is
incapable of sitting in judgment of the crime, the ICCC would have the
24. Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility. 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 635, 637 (2004).
25. United Nations Global Compact,
http://unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited June 10, 2008). See also
RICHARD D. HARTLEY, CORPORATE CRIME 111 (2008) (providing additional information on the
structure and principles of the United Nations Global Compact).
26. United Nations Global Compact, supra note 25.
27. The United Nations Security Council established the ICTY and the ICTR in 1993 and
1994, respectively. See Statute of the International Tribunal, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192;
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602.
2008]
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power to try the crime. The ICCC could draw on the ICC as a model in
multiple ways. For one, the same standards and options for initiating or
referring cases could be employed. As with the ICC,28 the UNSC could
refer cases to the ICCC or the chief prosecutor could employ her proprio
inotu powers to initiate an investigation. Additionally, as with the ICC, the
ICCC might only try cases if domestic jurisdictions were "unwilling or
unable." 29
B. Benefits of an ICCC
There are several advantages to an ICCC over a domestic court trying
corporate crimes.30 An international court established to address corporate
crimes would reduce the start-up and transaction costs inherent in creating
or expanding the jurisdiction of domestic courts to try these types of crimes.
The ICCC would have dedicated, recognized experts on staff who would
likely provide a higher level of authority to address corporate crimes. By
concentrating the world's resources into a single court to address corporate
crimes, the ICCC would promote burden sharing and establish a focal
point for coordination among the various states that might be involved in,
effected by, or even just concerned with corporate crimes. The ICCC's
credibility as a judicial body would be high (and, crucially, higher than
many domestic courts) because it would be set up by the United Nations
and staffed by recognized experts in the field of corporate activities and
international law. Over time, as the ICCC heard cases, it would develop a
body of knowledge and precedent, deepening and broadening the
expertise of its staff and the future understanding of matters involving
corporate social responsibility.
C. Drawbacks of an ICCC
My proposed solution may not be any more feasible than Seck's theory;
indeed, difficulties abound in trying to create an International Corporate
Criminal Court. For example, in contrast to state courts -and similar to the
ICC, ICTR, and ICTY themselves 31 -the ICCC may not have strong
28. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 13.
29. Id.. art. 17 ("ITihe Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible.., unless the State
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution .. "). This
aspect of the Rome Statute is popularly known as the "complementarity principle." See, e.g.,
Lijun Yang, On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 121 (2005) (analyzing the characteristics of the complementarity
principle).
30. This paragraph draws upon the literature on neoliberal institutionalism, an
international relations theory that contends that international institutions promote interstate
cooperation. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (2005) (arguing that international regimes
facilitate decentralized cooperation among self-interested actors).
31. International war crimes tribunals are often criticized for not being able to enforce
their arrest warrants. See, e.g., Han-Ru Zhou, The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants By
[Vol. 11
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enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, the ICCC would need to rely on
state support to apprehend suspects and impose sentences.
As with other international courts, the ICCC could be criticized for not
sufficiently acknowledging victims' interests or the preferences of
indigenous populations.32 On the other hand, the ICCC would be no worse
than a home state jurisdiction that usurped jurisdiction over a host state
and also did not include victims or indigenous populations in its process
and decision-making. Furthermore, if the ICCC shared the ICC's
complementarity principle, then the government of the territory in which
the crimes allegedly occurred or the government of the nationality of the
suspected criminal would first be able to try the corporate crimes, and the
ICCC would only exercise its power if said state were "unwilling or
unable." Through this mechanism, indigenous populations could still
participate in the process of promoting accountability for corporate crimes
committed against them.
V. CONCLUSION
Seck is to be commended for raising our awareness about corporate
crimes and the challenges of addressing them. Perhaps her proposal for
home state regulation is a more effective solution than a potentially
impotent, idealistic international court, given the political realities of the
international arena. At the very least, the problem of corporate crime is
serious enough that the proposals Seck and I offer are both worth thorough
consideration.
International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 202, 203 (2006) (observing
that "enforcement remains public international law's longstanding Achilles' heel" and
arguing that the ICTY needed to rely upon NATO to execute arrest warrants because states
would not cooperate with the ICTY and the UNSC would not act decisively).
32. The ICTR has suffered criticism for having an ineffective outreach program. See, e.g.,
Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JusT. 950, 955 (2005) ("Despite some progress with limited resources, the
[Rwandan] Tribunal's outreach efforts have been sorely lacking, with the result that most
Rwandans still know little if anything about trials in Arusha").
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